Strange But True: Claim and Suspend Social Security by Alicia H. Munnell et al.
May 2009, Number 9-11
STRANGE BUT TRUE: CLAIM AND 
SUSPEND SOCIAL SECURITY 
* Alicia H. Munnell is the Director of the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (CRR) and the Peter F. Drucker 
Professor of Management Sciences at Boston College’s Carroll School of Management.  Alex Golub-Sass is a research as-
sociate at the CRR.  Nadia Karamcheva is a graduate research assistant at the CRR.
Introduction 
With the current financial crisis wreaking havoc on 
retirement savings, many older people have had to 
reassess their retirement plans – they may decide to 
work longer or, if already retired, to re-enter the work-
force.  For those currently in the labor force, working 
longer increases monthly Social Security benefits.  
Social Security benefits are actuarially adjusted so 
that, on average, lifetime benefits remain the same 
whether a person retires at any age between 62 and 
70.  So the later a person retires, the higher the 
monthly benefit.  For those thinking of re-entering 
the workforce, Social Security provides for higher 
benefits later in exchange for withholding benefits 
while they are employed.  For those under the Full 
Retirement Age (currently 66), this adjustment is ac-
complished automatically through the annual retire-
ment earnings test.  For those over the Full Retire-
ment Age, the adjustment can be made through the 
voluntary option of “claim and suspend.”  
The “claim and suspend” strategy also enhances 
the claiming options of one-earner couples.  For 
example, a husband who reaches the Full Retirement 
Age may elect to claim and immediately suspend 
benefits, allowing his wife to receive a spousal benefit 
based on his earnings record.  The husband is then 
free to continue working and receive delayed retire-
ment credits, which increases not only his monthly 
benefit but also his wife’s survivor benefit.  By using 
“claim and suspend” in this way, the couple can en-
hance the value of their lifetime benefits.
This brief discusses the “claim and suspend” strat-
egy.  The first section outlines the provision and its 
application for individuals re-entering the workforce.  
The second section describes how this provision 
applies to the claiming behavior of married couples 
and uses data from the Health and Retirement Study to 
calculate the cost to Social Security.  The final section 
concludes that the gains of “claim and suspend” to 
those who must work longer could be quite signifi-
cant in terms of higher monthly benefits for life and 
that the potential cost is modest (probably less than $1 
billion per year). 
“Claim and Suspend” and 
Re-Entrants
Unlike past recessions, the labor force participation 
rate of older men has increased during this financial 
crisis (see Figure 1 on the next page).  This pattern 
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Those over the Full Retirement Age who go back to 
work have a much more flexible option.  As a result 
of the Senior Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act of 2000, 
they are no longer subject to the annual earnings 
test but rather can voluntarily “claim and suspend.”  
That is, they can either work and receive full benefits 
or voluntarily suspend payments.  If they choose to 
suspend, they forfeit current benefits but earn delayed 
retirement credits (DRCs) for a permanent increase 
in their future monthly benefits (see Figure 3 on the 
next page).  This strategy is very helpful to those who 
earn enough to support themselves, because it allows 
them to increase the amount of future monthly Social 
Security benefits – a special kind of income that is 
fully inflation-adjusted and payable for life.  
Similarities and Differences
In essence, “claim and suspend” is a continuation of 
the annual earnings test.  In both cases, the retiree 
forgoes benefits while working for an actuarially 
increased benefit in the future.3  The two strategies 
differ in that one is mandatory and one is voluntary.4  
The notion is that the benefit at the Full Retirement 
Age is the target amount; workers with earnings 
should be building towards this goal rather than 
receiving benefits when they do not really need them.  
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Figure 2. Impact of Annual Earnings Test on 
Replacement Rate Provided to Medium Earner, 
by Age
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008 Social Se-
curity Trustees Report; assumes an individual claims at age 
62 and works until age 63 earning a salary that reduces his 
Social Security benefit by half. 
suggests that some people are re-entering the labor 
force as they find their retirement resources to be 
inadequate.  For those re-entering, Social Security has 
two provisions that allow workers to enhance future 
benefits by having benefits withheld while they work.
Figure 1. Index of Labor Force Participation 
Rates for Men Aged 55 and Older, by Months 
into Recession
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (2009).
The Annual Retirement Earnings Test
Those under the Full Retirement Age will find their 
Social Security benefits automatically reduced when 
they go back to work.  In 2009, for each dollar of 
earnings in excess of $14,160, benefits are reduced by 
$1 for each $2 earned.  Many economic studies have 
shown that this test discourages work because most 
beneficiaries are unaware that the reduction in ben-
efits while working triggers an increase in benefits 
later.1  In fact, benefits foregone while working are in 
effect rolled forward to increase people’s Social Secu-
rity benefits after they reach the Full Retirement Age.2 
An example might help.  Assume that the per-
son started to collect Social Security at age 62, but 
continued to work and only retired for good at 63.  
If that person earned so much that half his benefits 
were withheld, at the Full Retirement Age his ben-
efit would be raised to what it would have been if he 
had claimed at age 62 and a half (see Figure 2).  On 
average, the benefit a retiree receives is equal to the 
amount he would have received if the annual earn-
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Once workers have achieved the target amount, they 
are free to receive the benefit whether they need it 
or not.5  The important point is that Social Security 
has provisions for people to defer benefits if they go 
back to work so that they can have higher monthly 
benefits later.  Before 2000, a retired individual re-
entering the labor force after the Full Retirement Age 
could effectively defer benefits through the temporary 
reduction caused by the annual earnings test.  After 
the repeal of the annual earnings test in 2000 for 
individuals above the Full Retirement Age, he would 
no longer have had this option without the addition of 
the “claim and suspend” provision.
“Claim and Suspend” and 
Claiming Strategies
 
“Claim and suspend” also enhances the claiming 
options for married couples and thereby increases 
their potential lifetime benefits.  Earlier studies have 
shown that couples maximize their expected lifetime 
benefits by having the wife claim early and the hus-
band claim late.6  The intuition is that the wife will 
receive her relatively low spousal benefit and/or ben-
efit based on her own earnings only over the relatively 
short expected lifetime of her husband rather than 
over the relatively long expected life of the average 
woman.   Therefore, the wife – like any beneficiary 
with an expected short life – should claim early.  The 
wife’s survivor benefit, which she will receive once 
her husband dies, depends on her husband’s actual 
benefit.  To get as high a survivor benefit as pos-
sible, the husband should continue working as long 
as possible.  Thus, the optimal claiming ages for the 
husband and wife are 70 and 62, respectively.  
For the typical couple where the wife is three years 
younger than her husband, this optimal claiming 
strategy is reasonably feasible with “claim and sus-
pend.”  The husband can claim his benefits at today’s 
Full Retirement Age of 66, allowing his wife age 63 
to start collecting her spousal benefit.7  He can then 
suspend his benefit and increase the monthly amount 
by working to age 70.  Without “claim and suspend,” 
however, the typical couple cannot achieve this opti-
mal strategy.   The wife would have to wait until 67 
before she could claim.  Thus, the couple’s options 
would be constrained.
To understand the cost implications of the “claim 
and suspend” strategy, we use the 2006 Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) and focus on the joint claim-
ing decisions married couples must make when the 
eldest member is 62.8  The goal is to compare the 
lifetime benefits of couples when they can take advan-
tage of “claim and suspend” to the lifetime benefits 
under the old rules when the wife could not claim 
until the husband retired.  As expected, only a small 
portion (28 percent) of couples benefit from “claim 
and suspend.”  The beneficiaries are either single-
earner couples or those where the wife’s earnings are 
very small relative to the husband’s (see Figure 4).  
Figure 3. Impact of “Claim and Suspend” on 
Average Replacement Rate Provided to Medium 
Earner, by Age 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2008 Social Secu-
rity Trustees Report; assumes an individual claims at age 66 
and suspends benefits between the ages of 67 and 68.
Figure 4. Percent of Couples Using an Optimal 
Claiming Strategy Who Would “Claim and 
Suspend” by Ratio of Low to High Earner PIA*
* The PIA (Primary Insurance Amount) is the base amount 
used in computing Social Security benefits; it is equivalent 
to the amount payable to a retired worker who begins receiv-
ing benefits at the Full Retirement Age.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on University of Michi-
gan, Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 2006; and U.S. 
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QuintileAfter all, wives with significant earnings could always 
claim in their own right and were never dependent on 
the claiming decision of their husbands.
The gain to these essentially one-earner couples 
from moving from a constrained optimizing claim-
ing strategy to a virtually unconstrained strategy with 
“claim and suspend” is relatively small – roughly $1 
billion per year (see Figure 5).  Moreover, this esti-
mate assumes that couples follow an optimal claim-
ing strategy, and evidence suggests that many do not.9  
(See Appendix for details on the calculations.)   
Conclusion
Since the beginning of the economic collapse, more 
people have been reentering the workforce in an at-
tempt to shore up their retirement savings.  The labor 
force participation rate for men aged 55 and older has 
risen substantially since October 2007 – the peak of 
the stock market.  Many of these men have already 
claimed Social Security and will be looking to build 
a sturdier retirement outlook.  After experiencing 
the recent volatility, individuals will undoubtedly be 
placing a greater premium on dependable streams of 
income like Social Security.  “Claim and suspend” al-
lows individuals to increase their level of dependable 
income in the future. 
Claim and suspend also offers one-earner couples 
more flexibility in executing their optimal claiming 
strategy.  The higher earner can claim at 66, allow 
his spouse – typically three years younger – to claim 
and then suspend his benefits while he continues to 
work and build up his monthly benefits.  Fortunately, 
the cost to Social Security of enhancing the claiming 
strategies for one-earner couples is modest – prob-
ably less than $1 billion per year given actual claim-
ing behavior.  This annual cost is swamped by the 
benefits of allowing people to increase their ultimate 
Social Security check.  The challenge is to make sure 
that everyone knows that “claim and suspend” is an 
available option.  
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Figure 5. Maximum Lifetime Benefits Paid to 
Couples Turning 62 in 2006 under Optimal 
Claiming Strategies with and without “Claim 
and Suspend,” 2006 Dollars (Billions) 










With "claim and suspend"Endnotes
1  Before the introduction of early retirement, the an-
nual earnings test was effectively a tax in that benefits 
lost one year did not produce a gain in benefits in 
later years.  Until recently, it partially retained the 
characteristics of a tax for employment after the Full 
Retirement Age, as the increase in benefits was not 
actuarially fair.
2  In some instances, the annual earnings test causes 
individuals to be worse off than had they not claimed 
before the Full Retirement Age.  Consider an individ-
ual who claims benefits at 62 but continues working 
until age 63.  If his salary is so high that his benefits 
are completely withheld, upon reaching the Full Re-
tirement Age he will be treated as if he claimed at 63.  
However, the recalculation will not take into account 
the fact that the individual did not receive a higher 
benefit for the time between when he stopped work-
ing and the Full Retirement Age.
3  In both cases, if the individual has a spouse, the 
survivor benefit is increased to the extent that it is 
based on the higher earner’s actual benefit.
4  They also differ in the timing of the increase.  
Under the annual earnings test, higher benefits 
are provided only once the worker attains the Full 
Retirement Age.  Under “claim and suspend,” higher 
benefits are payable as soon as the worker re-claims.  
5  If the individual has a spouse, “claim and suspend” 
leaves the spousal benefit unaffected, but the annual 
earnings test will reduce spousal benefits that are 
based on the worker’s earnings record.
6  See Munnell and Soto (2005).  The text refers to 
the typical situation, in which the wife’s earnings 
are low relative to the husband’s earnings.  But the 
optimal claiming strategy for a given couple depends 
critically on the difference in ages between the two 
spouses and the difference in their relative earnings.
7  Under current law, the Full Retirement Age is 
increasing gradually from the traditional age of 65 to 
age 67.  An individual’s date of birth determines his 
or her Full Retirement Age.
8  Because of the low number of couples reaching 
age 62, we augmented our sample size to get a more 
reliable estimation.  See Appendix for further explana-
tion.
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9  Sass, Sun and Webb (2008) estimate that couples 
leave upwards of 4 percent of their potential benefits 
on the table.
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ing Office.APPENDIXAppendix: The Cost of the “Claim and Suspend” Strategy
The analysis is based on 1,006 couples with the eldest member aged 62-70 in the 2006 Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS).  The HRS restricted and self-reported earnings data make it possible to calculate Social Security’s 
primary insurance amounts (PIAs).  The PIA is used to calculate the cumulative lifetime benefits earned by 
couples based on their joint retirement ages.  (To estimate steady state annual costs, we assumed a Full Retire-
ment Age of 66 and delayed retirement credits of 8 percent for each year benefits are postponed.)  The analysis 
also assumes individuals attempt to maximize benefits paid to their household and consequently couples make 
cooperative claiming decisions. 
     The first step is to determine each couple’s optimal claiming ages and subsequent lifetime benefits under 
conventional claiming methods – without the use of the “claim and suspend” strategy.  We adjust each couple’s 
circumstances to evaluate their claiming decisions as if the oldest member were 62 in 2006.  We then com-
pute potential benefits at each age discounted for probability of survival and interest.  Based on 1948 cohort life 
tables, we then used relative mortality rates for 12 gender-race-education categories from Brown, Liebman, and 
Pollet (2002) to calculate the total expected benefits paid to each household at each combination of possible 
claiming ages, taking expected survivor benefits into account as well.   
     For the husband’s claiming age of i and the wife’s claiming age of j, total expected benefits, TotBij, is equal to 
where BenHi is the benefit received by the husband, probHx is the probability that the husband is alive at time x, 
Survij is the survivor benefit paid to the surviving spouse, BenWj is the benefit received by the wife, and ProbWy 
is the probability that the wife is alive at time y.  If an individual is eligible for both personal and spousal 
benefits, he or she will receive the larger of the two.  We then identify the couple’s combination of claiming 
ages that yield the highest expected lifetime benefits, and assume it to be their optimal claiming strategy under 
conventional behavior.   
     The second step is to determine each couple’s optimal claiming ages and subsequent lifetime benefits when 
using the “claim and suspend” strategy.  To introduce this strategy, we restrict one member of the couple from 
claiming benefits until he or she reaches age 66 and permit the spouse to claim a spousal benefit once the 
restricted member reaches the Full Retirement Age, regardless of whether or not he has claimed.  (It is impor-
tant to note that a large share of individuals claim as soon as they become eligible and do not follow the optimal 
behavior assumed in our estimates.)  When the husband is the restricted member, the total expected benefits 
paid to the household, TotB´Hij, will be
If the husband’s age is greater than the FRA when the wife’s age is y, her benefit, BenWjy, is the greater of her 
retired worker benefit and the spousal benefit she is entitled to based on her husband’s earnings record.  If the 
wife is the restricted member, the total expected benefits paid to the household, TotB´Wij, will be
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120If the wife’s age is greater than the FRA when the husband’s age is x, his benefit, BenHix, is the greater of his 
retired worker benefit and the spousal benefit he is entitled to based on his wife’s earnings record.  We assume 
the couple will use whichever strategy yields the higher expected household benefit. 
     The third step involves, for each couple, subtracting the expected lifetime benefits paid under the conven-
tional claiming strategy from the expected lifetime benefits paid under the “claim and suspend” strategy.  If the 
difference is negative, we assume the couple will not use the strategy and there will be a zero net cost to Social 
Security.  If the difference is positive, we assume the couple will use the strategy and the gain over the con-
ventional claiming behavior is the cost incurred by that couple to Social Security.  (Of course, currently, many 
people do not follow optimal strategies, so our estimates essentially produce an upper boundary of the cost to 
Social Security.)  
     Finally, the HRS weights were then applied to calculate average gains made by couples when using this 
strategy.  The total cost to Social Security is then found by multiplying those averages by the actual number of 
couples in which the eldest member is aged 62 from the 2006 Current Population Survey.
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